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We investigated the effect of migration on population dynamics in England & Wales 
and Scotland from the mid-nineteenth century to the present by comparing actual 
population size and structure with estimates based on zero net migration from a 
range of starting dates. In this period, Scotland had the largest net outflow among 
countries in Europe for which detailed information is available, whereas overall net 
migration in England & Wales was close to zero. In the absence of migration, 
population would have been over twice as large in Scotland in 2013 as the actual 
value, but similar to its actual value in England & Wales. Levels and pace of 
population ageing have been broadly similar in both countries, so the major impact of 
differential migration has been on population size rather than structure. We discuss 
these findings in relation to the debate on migration policy between political parties 
supporting and opposing independence in the 2014 Scottish referendum. 
 
Keywords: England & Wales; Scotland; migration; demographic modelling; historical 
trends.
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Introduction 
Migration has become an increasingly important factor in population change in 
European countries; net migration accounted for 85 per cent of population increase 
in the European Community in 2014 (Eurostat 2015). Immigration is frequently 
advocated for its assumed economic benefits, for example: ‘There is thus general 
consensus in the literature that migration is a valid policy approach in the context of 
a demographic deficit. Immigration to Europe will in the short term achieve 
immediate increases in total fertility rates, population growth and labour market 
contribution’. (Harper 2012, p. 2). Even the nationalistic Russian President Putin has 
recently advocated selective migration, in addition to increasing fertility, as a way of 
stimulating population growth in the Russian Federation (Putin 2012). However, 
public attitudes to migration are much less positive. The Pew Research Center 
Survey of 2014 found that 55 per cent of respondents in the UK stated that fewer 
migrants should be allowed in, compared with 6 per cent who wanted more migration 
(Pew Research Center 2014). Similar poll results have been found across Europe; 
the recent Gallup World Poll found only 7.5 per cent of Europeans in favour of 
increased migration and 52 per cent in favour of its reduction (IOM Migration 
Research Division 2015).  
Political concern about the dangers of population decline or growth rates 
relatively lower than those of neighbouring countries has been a recurrent theme in 
European history (Teitelbaum and Winter 1985; Winter and Teitelbaum 2013) but 
contemporary governments have to balance competing pressures. A comparison of 
England & Wales and Scotland provides a particularly relevant case study. Among 
countries across Europe with detailed long-term information, Scotland has had the 
largest net outflow from about the middle of the nineteenth century to the present, 
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whereas overall net migration in England & Wales has been close to zero over the 
period. There has been considerable political and media support for population 
growth in Scotland (Anderson 2012), but little in England and Wales. 
The population of Scotland fell by 3 per cent p.a. over the period 1971-2001, 
whereas in England & Wales it grew by 7 per cent (Jefferies 2005, Table 1.8). The 
issue that we address here is the long-term demographic consequences of past 
migration in the two countries, which may help to explain why such different views 
about population growth co-exist in the same island.  
England & Wales and Scotland are not nation states, but parts of the United 
Kingdom, which included Ireland until 1922 and Northern Ireland since then. 
Information on Ireland is not available over the period covered here. Migration 
therefore includes those moving within the United Kingdom as well as international 
movements outside the United Kingdom. 
Much attention has been given to the analysis of short-term labour market 
implications of migration levels in a variety of countries but a number of studies have 
also looked at future scenarios that compare population size and structures based 
on projections that include assumptions about future migration and with no net 
migration (United Nations Population Division, 2000). Such no-migration scenarios 
are commonly produced as part of regular official projections (Office for National 
Statistics 2015a; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015). 
Some are stylized and present results to show that certain objectives cannot 
plausibly be met, such as that South Korea would need to import the population of 
the whole world to maintain the current ratio of older to younger people (United 
Nations Population Division 2000). Other studies compare a no-net-migration 
scenario with the best official assessment in medium variant population projections 
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to show the impact on population size and structure of the migration assumptions 
adopted. However, even such ‘realistic’ projections must be treated with caution. 
Migration is volatile and the constant or gentle trends drifting towards zero in most 
scenarios are clearly unrealistic. We need to look at how migration has affected long-
term population trends in practice as well as in theory. We require analyses of the 
experiences of real populations to assess the impact of migration on population size 
and structure. To our knowledge, few such analyses have been undertaken. Le Bras 
(1991) and Philipov and Schuster (2010) are exceptions for Europe, but their 
analyses were not over extended historical periods. 
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the data used and describe the 
development of the models we used to estimate the impact of net migration on 
population size and structure. We then present the results of an analysis that 
compares trends in England & Wales and Scotland. We discuss the implications of 
these findings for both demographic history and the role that migration policy played 
in the 2014 referendum on independence for Scotland. 
 
Data and methods 
Data for England & Wales and for Scotland were taken from the Human Mortality 
Database (HMD), which contains information on estimated mortality rates and 
population size by single year of age and sex for each calendar year from around the 
time of the start of national vital registration, 1841 and 1855 respectively. These 
estimates are based on information from official statistics such as censuses, vital 
registration, and population estimates over this period (Wilmoth et al. 2007; Human 
Mortality Database 2015). The database also includes information on total annual 
number of births and deaths. Mortality rates are available in both period and cohort 
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form for most years. Since our principal interest is in comparing national values, we 
use a common start date of 1855. Data are available up to 2013. 
We estimated the effect on population dynamics with no net migration by 
calculating survival of cohorts without migration from various time points starting with 
the earliest available date of 1855. For example, for those born after the start year of 
1855, the population numbers in the absence of migration are given by 
Pnomig(a,t) = Bnomig(t-a)Lx(a,t-a) 
where Pnomig(a,t) is population aged a in year t 
Bnomig(t-a) is births in year t-a (equivalently for birth cohort t-a) 
Lx(a,t-a) are the Lx values for age a based on a life table for the cohort t-a with 
radix set to 1. 
For years after 1855, the numbers of those born before 1855 are given by: 
Pnomig(a,t) = Pactual(a-(t-1855),1855) Lx(a,t-a)/Lx(a-(t-1855),t-a) 
where nomig refers to the no-migration population and actual to the original 
actual population. 
Cohort life tables from age zero to the age reached in 2013 (or age 110 if 
reached earlier) are available for cohorts born between 1841 and 1922 for England & 
Wales and 1855 to 1922 for Scotland in the HMD. Cohort mortality rates are not 
available for those born before the initial year, and we therefore constructed partial 
life tables for cohorts from the age that the cohort reached in 1855 up to age 110 
years. Cohort mortality rates are available for cohorts born between 1923 and 1982 
so we constructed cohort life tables to age reached by 2013 for those born in this 
period. For cohorts born after 1982, only period mortality rates are available, so we 
constructed approximate cohort life tables for those born in year t by using mortality 
rates for age 0 in year t, age 1 in year t+1 etc. up to the latest available year.  
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The no-net-migration population is assumed to have the same fertility and 
mortality patterns as the actual population. Annual information on age-specific fertility 
is only available from 1923 for England & Wales and after 1945 for Scotland. 
Therefore we estimated the expected number of births as follows: 
The distribution of age-specific fertility rates f(a), with Σf(a)=1, is given by a 
beta distribution, β(2.7,2.7), scaled to be between ages 15 and 45 with mean of 30 
and standard deviation of 6 years. This is a typical fertility pattern for populations 
over this period, and in practice results are insensitive to the chosen pattern. 
The actual number of births in year t, Borig(t), is given by: 
Bactual (t) = k(t)ΣPactual (a,t)f(a)       (1)  
where Pactual (a,t) is the actual population aged a in year t. 
This provides an estimate of k(t), the level of fertility in year t, as the expected 
number of children per adult with the above fertility distribution. 
 
The number of births in the no-migration population is calculated as 
Bnomig(t) = k(t)ΣPnomig(a,t)f(a)       (2) 
 (1) provides an estimate of the level of fertility k(t) and (2) provides an 
estimate of Bnomig(t). 
Thus we assumed that the ratio of births Bnomig(t) to Bactual(t) was equal to the 
ratio of the corresponding populations at risk of reproducing, weighted by the values 
of a representative fertility schedule. This is an indirect standardization method with 
the standard population rates being those of a typical fertile population. Note that we 
use the schedule for populations with both sexes combined rather than just for 
women as in most applications, but this makes no difference to our substantive 
conclusions (for further details see Appendix A). This procedure differs from Philipov 
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and Schuster’s (2010) Method 1, where they assumed no migration from birth for 
cohorts from 1947, but did not allow for the fact that if there was no migration, the 
number of births would be different. Over time, the values with and without migration 
will diverge and the annual number of births will become increasingly inconsistent 
with the population at risk of giving birth, leading to problems in the interpretation of 
findings.  
We repeated this exercise with net migration being set to zero from time 
points 10 years apart between 1860 (Scottish values just after the 1855 start date 
that may understate number of vital events) and 2000, to assess the long-term 
effects on population up to the latest available year of 2013. Values before the no-
migration start date were unaltered. 
 
Fertility assumptions for no-migration scenarios 
We assumed that the fertility rates of the no-migration population were the same as 
those of the actual population since differences in number of births depends only on 
populations at risk. This assumption needs to be justified. Immigrants sometimes 
have elevated fertility after arrival since they may be rejoining families or ‘catching 
up’ following the disruption of family life by migration (Hervitz 1985; Andersson 
2004). On the other hand some migrants may be selected for lower fertility, possibly 
being more highly educated and career-oriented and in these cases migration may 
delay or inhibit family formation. The available evidence shows a variety of 
differences between the fertility level of emigrants and that of the static population. 
For example, French migrants to Québec in the eighteenth century had very high 
fertility while mainland France was already starting to show signs of fertility limitation 
(Henripin and Péron 1972). On the other hand, Irish migrants to USA had lower 
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fertility than those who remained (Guinnane et al. 2006). We cannot conclude that 
either group would have had the same levels if they had not migrated since the 
Canadian frontier environment was conducive to high fertility whereas urban life in 
the nineteenth-century US may have been the reverse. US data suggest that 
migrants from Latin and South America have higher fertility than both those who 
remain and US natives (Lichter et al. 2012), although these conclusions are sensitive 
to the choice of indicator (Parrado 2011). Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald (2002) 
found that emigrants to Australia had higher fertility than their peers who remained in 
the Netherlands, Italy, or Greece, whereas those from the United Kingdom had lower 
fertility. The differences were small but groups tended to move towards Australian 
levels. Fertility of intra-European immigrants is similar to levels in the host country 
across European countries (Office for National Statistics 2014, Table 4; 
OECD/European Union 2015).  
There has been considerable discussion of the interpretation of migrant and 
non-migrant fertility data, and how pre- and post-arrival patterns can be combined 
(Toulemon 2004). However, for our analysis this was not an issue on substantive or 
technical grounds. There is little evidence of such disruption effects for the European 
populations we were mainly concerned with (Andersson 2004; Devolder and Bueno 
2011). There is a clear distinction between births prior to migration since the child will 
be classified as a migrant on arrival, and after migration, when the child will be 
classified as native.  
While the proportion of births to overseas-born mothers was just over one 
quarter in England & Wales and 14 per cent in Scotland in 2011 (Office for National 
Statistics 2012, Figure 10), these figures were much smaller in the past. In the 1851 
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Census, only 0.5 per cent of the population in England & Wales and 0.4 per cent in 
Scotland were recorded as being born outside the United Kingdom and these were 
overwhelmingly from other European societies with levels of fertility similar to 
Britain’s, so the effect on the overall average level would have been very small. 
Although care is needed in interpreting fertility data on migrants owing to the 
disruption effect, there is evidence that recent migrants to Europe who come from 
other continents often have higher fertility than the native population and that this is 
sufficient to increase total fertility rate levels by 0.1 children per woman in England & 
Wales in 2011, but only 0.02 in Scotland where the proportion of such women is 
smaller (Office for National Statistics 2012).  
A number of studies suggest that the fertility of second-generation and later-
generation immigrants tends to move towards the level of fertility prevailing in the 
host country (Glusker 2003; Parrado and Morgan 2008; Waters and Pineau 2015), 
and since we were concerned with fertility over multiple generations, this reinforces 
our case that there appeared to be no strong reason in our initial counterfactual 
scenario to assume that the fertility of migrants differed from that of the populations 
we were concerned with.  
There is some inconsistency in that the fertility of emigrants is assumed to be 
that of their original population, whereas that of immigrants is assumed to be that of 
the host population. This is the standard assumption of no-migration scenarios 
produced by official agencies. The actual impact of migration on fertility is the 
difference between the loss of people and their subsequent births owing to 
emigration and the corresponding gain from immigrants. There is no strong evidence 
to identify what would have been the probable fertility of both sets of migrants if in 
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fact they had not migrated, or even the magnitude of such gross flows for these 
countries. Our estimates are therefore simply of what would be the outcome if we 
assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that fertility and mortality of 
both immigrants and emigrants and their descendants had been the same as that of 
the observed national population.  This assumption could be amended, especially for 
recent periods when more information on the fertility of migrant groups is becoming 
available (Jeffries 2005), although it less so for information on the fertility of 
emigrants.   
Although there is evidence that the convergence of fertility to national levels 
for descendants of those migrant groups originally from some non-European 
countries is proceeding more slowly than for others (Kulu et al. 2015), the numbers 
of these migrant groups were small in former times, and, as we show later, the main 
trend was that of migrants leaving Great Britain rather than the reverse. Over the 
extended period of this study, there is no evidence that emigrants from Britain were 
likely to achieve either higher or lower fertility abroad than if they had remained in 
their original country. Although we have argued that differentials between native and 
migrant demography were likely to be relatively small and unimportant for this 
analysis, there are advantages in looking at an example with negative net migration 
since the impact of non-native migrants would then be even less than in the case of 
positive inflows. 
If overall observed fertility was higher than native fertility but lower than 
immigrant fertility, this would give a slightly higher number of births in the no- 
migration case than if native-only values had been used. The method would under-
estimate the impact of migration on population change and therefore our results 
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would—if anything—be conservative. Since we are concerned not only—or even 
principally—with the fertility of migrants but also with that of their descendants, who 
tend to adapt to prevailing levels, this further supports the case for assuming the 
same fertility for all population groups in this study.  
Long-term fertility implications 
The estimation procedures we have used are based on net rather than gross 
migration; gross migration flows are not available. Even though Scotland 
experienced substantial net outflows, there were also major inflows—initially 
overwhelmingly from Ireland. Since Ireland was part of the United Kingdom at that 
time along with Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland), this was internal rather 
than international migration, and our analysis does not distinguish between them. At 
the start of the period, 7 per cent of the population enumerated in Scotland in 1851 
were born in Ireland, in part following mass emigration driven by the Irish Potato 
Famine of the late 1840s. In 1901 the Irish-born accounted for 4.6 per cent of 
Scotland’s population, though in the twentieth century the largest immigrant groups 
were from England & Wales (Brabar 2012). 
The overall long-term impact of migration on population includes the 
contribution not only of migrants themselves, but of their offspring. Indeed, over time 
the majority of long-term population gain (or loss) through migration is not from the 
original migrants but from the numbers of their descendants. With assimilation, these 
descendants are increasingly born to parents with both migrant and non-migrant 
forebears and any distinction between ‘migrant’ and ‘non-migrant’ becomes 
meaningless at the individual level. There is no such person as a ‘net migrant’, but 
net migration is meaningful as a macro-level variable. We have simply assumed that 
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an individual of a given age at a particular time point will generate the same average 
flow of population numbers in years to come irrespective of migration status (in the 
case of an emigrant, this flow will be negative). While our results are based on the 
assumption that fertility was the same in the actual and no-migration populations, 
this assumption can be relaxed if required either to produce alternative scenarios or 
to incorporate more detailed data if information on long-term gross flows were to 
become available. However, this would require much more detailed data and strong 
assumptions (Murphy 2016, forthcoming). 
Results 
We present results with net migration being set to zero from 1855 and every 10 
years starting from 1860. We show the long-term effects of migration patterns in 
various time periods on population in the latest year, 2013 (although for clarity, we 
show graphical results only every 20 years; full results are available on request). We 
start with some descriptive results. There are 11 European countries in the HMD with 
continuous information from the nineteenth century or earlier (Human Mortality 
Database 2015; Murphy 2016, forthcoming). Although there are European countries 
such as Ireland with less complete information that had higher levels, Scottish overall 
out-migration is twice as high as in any other country included in this set. It therefore 
provides a particularly clear case study for investigating the impact of migration. 
Scottish migration patterns are also noteworthy in that the flows have been 
consistently negative. In the period from 1855, when records first became available 
from vital registration, in 132 out of the 145 years up to 2000 net migration was 
negative for Scotland (although positive in all years of the twenty-first century so far). 
In England & Wales, the overall net migration rate is close to zero and more years 
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had positive net outflows than net inflows, although migration tended to be negative 
in the earlier part of the period and positive later. 
Net migration was more negative in Scotland than in England & Wales for 
virtually every decade from the mid-nineteenth century (Table 1). Over the whole 
period 1855 to 2013, the annual average net migration rate showed a loss of about 
3.1 persons out of every 1,000 in Scotland but the value was close to zero in 
England & Wales where the mean gain was 0.2 per 1,000. These values do not, of 
course, relate only to natives. Emigrants will include immigrants who subsequently 
move to another country, such as Irish migrants from Scotland, and immigrants will 
include native-born Scots who return after a period living abroad.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
We estimated the total impact of migrants and their offspring by comparing 
the actual values with the no-migration scenarios that allowed for the fact that 
subsequent birth cohort numbers would differ from those observed since the 
population of childbearing age would be different. Figure 1 shows the estimated 
national population sizes up to 2013 if net migration had been zero from a number of 
time points over the past 160 years. For England & Wales, the impact of net 
migration is small; around year 2000 the actual population size was in the middle of 
a narrow range of zero migration estimates, although moving above these in the very 
latest period. In contrast, Scotland shows a much larger impact of migration with 
actual numbers in 2013 substantially lower than in the no-migration cases. The effect 
is largely monotonic and cumulative; the longer the period when migration is 
excluded, the larger the subsequent impact of net migration. In 2013 the population 
in Scotland was 1.9 times its value in 1855, but the corresponding figure for England 
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& Wales was three times larger over the same period (Table 2). If there had been no 
net migration from 1855, the ranking of these ratios would be reversed—the 2013 
population in Scotland would have been over four times that of the 1855 population 
compared with just below a three-fold increase for England & Wales. While migration 
had little impact on population growth in England & Wales over this extended period, 
it led to the size of the Scottish population being 5.3 million in 2013, under half of the 
11.4 million people that would have been expected if net migration had been close to 
zero (Table 2). 
[Figure 1 and Table 2 about here] 
 
Note that the interpretation of the results that assume zero net migration is 
analogous to the interpretation of the ‘no migration’ variant in standard population 
projections that show the sensitivity of population size and structure to alternative 
futures. The results reveal the difference in population size and structure that would 
have been observed with and without net migration with the stated assumptions. The 
results also indicate the fraction of actual population change attributable to migration 
by apportioning overall change between the direct and indirect effects of migration 
and fertility and mortality. This latter interpretation of these results may also be used 
to show the impact of net migration in different time periods. For example, the 
difference in 2013 estimates between the actual population and one with net 
migration being set to zero between 1900 and 1925 gives the net impact of migration 
in the period 1900 to 1925 because the observed and no-migration populations have 
identical demographic regimes for all other time periods outside this window.  
Table 3 decomposes the difference between the actual population size in 
2013 and its size if there had been no migration to the intervening time intervals 
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between 1855 and 2013. In the absence of migration, the population in England & 
Wales would be 2.8 million lower (4.0 per cent) than observed, whereas in Scotland 
it would have been 6.1 million (114 per cent) higher. In Scotland, every interval 
contributed positively to this difference, apart from the most recent one when the 
longstanding pattern of a positive net migration outflow was reversed. While there 
were outflows over most of the period, the largest impacts of Scottish migration on 
current population occurred in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth 
centuries. 
[Table 3 about here] 
For England & Wales, net migration in about half of the periods analysed 
contributed positively, and in about half contributed negatively to population size in 
2013. However, migration in all decades from 1930 contributed to a larger actual 
population size than would have been the case in the absence of migration. The 
impact of migration in the most recent period has been very substantial, with 
population size in 2013 being 3.4 million higher owing to migration since 2000, 
whereas the impact of migration over the whole period 1855-2000 would have led to 
a population slightly lower than observed, by about 550 thousand people. For 
England & Wales, no periods are particularly influential in relation to total population 
size, for either positive outflows or inflows apart from the most recent period.  
Although the overall impact of migration on population numbers in Great 
Britain during the late nineteenth century and twentieth century was to reduce 
growth, much debate has taken place about the possible negative consequences of 
immigration and a number of restrictions on settlement have been introduced from 
the 1960s, following the increase that occurred in the 1950s.  
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Natural and total growth 
A migration event will change population numbers by one when it occurs. In the 
longer term, the values from later generations depend on the fertility and mortality of 
descendants and the extent to which they remain distinctive, though we assume 
convergence as discussed in the methods section. Population growth is determined 
not only by migration but also by fertility, mortality, and the sex and age structure of 
the initial population although the impact of initial conditions becomes attenuated 
over time.  Ultimately different initial populations that are subject to the same— 
possibly time-varying—rates will have identical age distributions and growth rates in 
the absence of migration (Arthur 1982). Fertility and mortality rates have been 
broadly similar in England & Wales and Scotland over the past 150 years or so, with 
mortality somewhat higher in Scotland and life expectancy there being on average 
about two or three years less than that in England & Wales from about 1900, so 
Scottish levels were typically those of England & Wales about one decade earlier 
(Figure 2a). Therefore in this period, Scotland’s mortality disadvantage was more 
than offset by its generally higher fertility, using the sex-neutral TFR measure 
defined in Appendix A (Figure 2b).  
[Figure 2] 
The joint effect of fertility and mortality on population change is shown using 
the NRR-type measure defined in Appendix A and the corresponding intrinsic rate of 
growth (Figure 2c). The NRR value was 20 per cent higher in Scotland than in 
England & Wales in the first part of the twentieth century, the same value as that 
determined by Glass and Blacker (1938). The Scottish higher intrinsic rate of growth 
reinforces the conclusion of the earlier analysis that Scotland would have grown 
faster than England & Wales in the absence of migration over this extended period, 
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although fertility has been lower in Scotland than in England & Wales in recent 
decades. We therefore conclude that migration has been the dominant force in the 
major divergences in population growth between these two populations, even though 




We now consider the interplay of fertility and mortality trends in relation to the other 
main focus of the demographic impact of migration, which is its effect on population 
age structure. Migration is widely advocated as a response to population ageing so 
we estimated how migration has influenced population ageing over an extended 
period. We present two widely-used indicators of population ageing: (i) the proportion 
of people aged 65 and over, and (ii) the potential support ratio, the ratio of people of 
nominal working age, 20 to 64, to those aged 65 and over. This gives the number of 
potential workers per nominal retiree, the reciprocal of the so-called old-age 
dependency ratio (OADR).These measures are demographic ratios rather than 
indicators of social or economic dependency, and they ignore the fact that over time 
typical ages at starting and finishing working life have changed. Nevertheless, the 
measures are in widespread use in discussions of population ageing.  
For both England & Wales and Scotland, the proportion aged 65 and over 
increased from about 5 per cent to 16 per cent over the twentieth century, although 
the values in Scotland were generally slightly lower than for England & Wales by 
about 0.5 of a percentage point on average in this period (Figure 3a). As might be 
expected, migration has little influence on population structure in England & Wales 
and values were similar irrespective of migration. For Scotland, the effect of 
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migration is larger and its outcome has been to make the population structure older, 
with the proportion aged 65 and over typically being about 1.5 percentage points 
higher than it would have been with no migration. In consequence, the observed 
pattern in Scotland is closer to that observed in England & Wales than it is to the 
Scottish no-migration pattern.  
Rather than the proportion aged over 65, we prefer to concentrate on the 
potential support ratio of nominal workers to retirees since this is more directly 
related to economic sustainability (Figure 3b). The potential support ratio was less 
favourable in Scotland than in England & Wales in the nineteenth century and early 
part of the twentieth, but more recently it has been broadly similar and even slightly 
larger than that of England & Wales. However, without migration, Scotland would 
have had a distinctly more favourable profile, typically by about an additional 
working-age person for each retiree over the twentieth century. High migration from 
Scotland in the early part of the twentieth century (Table 2) led to a deficit of older 
people many decades later that partially offset the impact on population ageing of 
larger fertility falls in Scotland than in England & Wales in recent decades. However, 
the main conclusion is that the impact of migration on population ageing was limited, 
typically shifting the curves in Figure 3 by about 15 to 20 years, with this lag tending 
to fall over time as the impact of migration early in the twentieth century faded. Even 
though Scotland had very high migration rates compared with other European 
countries over this extended time scale, the effect on population structure was 
limited and declining over this period. The larger potential support ratio for Scotland 
than for England & Wales in the no-migration case is a result of the fact that the 
population would have been growing more quickly owing to its higher fertility and 
therefore the ratio of young to old age groups would have been higher.  
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[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Discussion 
Much of the current debate about immigration has centred not on its contribution to 
overall numbers but on its impact on population structure, especially in relation to the 
sustainability of pensions and health care systems (United Nations 2000). Against 
this background, the recent Scottish independence referendum of 2014, which 
ended in a majority decision (55 per cent to 45 per cent) not to opt for independence, 
provided the opportunity for a range of issues to be debated openly, including 
migration. 
The pro-independence Scottish National Party’s (SNP) manifesto for the 2015 
General Election advocated an ‘Immigration policy that works for Scotland’, arguing 
that ‘Diversity is one of Scotland's great strengths. Effective immigration controls are 
important, but we must also remember that those who have come to Scotland from 
other countries make a significant contribution to our economy and our society. We 
will support sensible immigration policies that meet our economic needs’ (Scottish 
National Party 2015, p.9). The former Labour administration in the Scottish Assembly 
had also advocated increased migration in response to Scotland's relatively low rates 
of population growth. A decade earlier in February 2004, Jack McConnell, the 
Labour Scottish Executive First Minister had directly linked migration to demographic 
trends stating that: ‘The single biggest challenge facing Scotland as we move further 
in the 21st century is our falling population’ (Scottish Executive 2004, p. 1).  
In the discussion of migration policy during the 2014 independence 
referendum, Scottish politicians argued that their pro-immigration policy would 
mitigate the perceived problems of population size and population ageing and 
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provide social, economic, and demographic benefits. It is relatively unusual for 
politicians to argue that immigration has major intrinsic benefits. Immigration is more 
often treated as a necessary evil, attributable to such national failures as having too 
few children or not producing workers with the right type of employment skills. The 
generally negative attitude of the UK to immigration was seen in Scotland as largely 
reflecting the interests of the more populous England & Wales. The two main political 
parties in the UK, both of which opposed independence, were advocating further 
restrictions on immigration. The difference between the attitudes of Westminster and 
Scottish governments to immigration was exemplified by the fact that in the 2013 UN 
report on monitoring population policies, only two European countries, the UK and 
Serbia, stated that they wished to reduce the immigration of skilled migrants (United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2013).  
In 2014 the figure for net migration to the UK was 320 thousand (Office for 
National Statistics 2015b). During the 2015 General Election campaign, the 
Conservative Party stated that it remained their objective to keep net migration down 
to the tens of thousands and to make it more difficult for EU migrants to claim 
welfare and housing benefits (Conservative Party 2015). The Labour Party pledged 
to employ more border staff, to reduce benefits, and to cap the number of non-EU 
migrant workers (Labour Party 2015).  
Migration has a clear impact on population size, but many also see 
immigration as a permanent solution to the economic challenges associated with 
population ageing. This is an error, as the analysis above shows, unless levels of 
immigration consistently increase. As Preston and Stokes point out (2012, p. 222), it 
is only change in migration rates that can alter population structures. The impact of 
emigration over the past 150 years on population size has been substantial in 
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Scotland. The population is less than half the size it would have been in the absence 
of that emigration, but the effect on population structure has been very modest. The 
emigration has led to only a relatively small change in the proportion of older people 
in the population as compared to England & Wales, where emigration has had little 
effect on either size or structure. 
We have compared two constituent parts of the United Kingdom, one part with 
negligible levels of net migration and one where it has been substantial. They have 
been subject to similar, although not identical, social and governance systems, but 
the substantial differences in economic opportunities between the two have led to 
very different migration pressures and trends (Devine 2012). Concerns about the 
level of immigration have increased substantially in recent years, and it is a major 
issue in the debates preceding another referendum, in June 2016, that in which the 
subject is the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union.  
Our findings reinforce the conclusion from earlier theoretical studies that 
migration is likely to have little effect on long-term population structure in decades to 
come. Results that depend on assumptions about migration patterns well in excess 
of 50 years ahead may have difficulty in convincing sceptics, but we have shown that 
shown that migration has had a substantial effect only on population size.   
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Appendix A 
The fertility measure k(t) is the average number of children per person required to 
produce the observed number of births in that year. This is based on an assumed 
pattern of fertility between ages 15 to 45 given by a beta distribution as discussed in 
the Methods section. It is similar in interpretation to a gross reproduction rate (GRR) 
except that it relates all births to all adults, rather than confining daughters to women, 
i.e. it is also an age-standardized fertility measure for a population that contains 
equal numbers of people in each single-year-of-age group but in which fertility rates 
vary from year-to-year. Since we did not have annual age-specific fertility rates for 
even half the period analysed, we could not compute indicators such as TFR, GRR, 
or NRR in the traditional way. Therefore our approach is analogous to indirect 
standardization with a fixed rate distribution used to compare the observed number 
of events and expected number of events with the no-migration population.  
We used both sexes combined for consistency with the rest of the analysis, 
although we have replicated these calculations for daughters per woman and sons 
per man separately to assess the sensitivity of results to these alternatives (all the 
analyses presented here can be undertaken separately for males and females). In 
order to compare the value of children per adult, we multiplied the value by 2 to 
approximate to the average number of children per woman so this indicator (Total, 
shown in Appendix Figure A) is on the same scale as the traditional TFR. We also 
constructed the value based on number of children per woman (TFR_alt), which is 
the basis of the conventional official TFR. For the period for which we do have 
annual estimates, from 1923 in the case of England & Wales, values are very similar 
(Appendix Figure A) in levels, and the correlation between the official and model 
values is over 0.99.  
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[Insert Appendix Figure A about here] 
Trends in values for men, women, and both sexes combined are very similar, 
but the levels are slightly different. This is largely because the number of men aged 
15 to 45 was smaller than the number of women in the same age group in earlier 
periods, so that each man in this age range would need to have more children on 
average to obtain the same number of births.  
The results with these alternative fertility indices are very similar and do not 
lead to any substantive differences in the interpretation of our findings related to the 
impact of migration on population size and structure that is the subject of this paper. 
Since the method is based on the ratio of populations at risk of actual and no- 
migration populations, any biases would be expected to affect estimates in the same 
way.  
We have also constructed a period measure analogous to the conventional 
net reproduction rate by multiplying the beta distribution values by the Lx values in 
the period life table of a given year to obtain the expected number of children a new-
born would expect to have if he or she experienced the period fertility and mortality 
rates of a given year throughout life. We used these period fertility measures 
together with mortality estimates to compare the demographic regimes in England & 
Wales and Scotland in Figure 2. From this NRR-type measure, we also estimated 
the intrinsic rate of growth on the basis that the NRR is approximately the result of 
the annual intrinsic crate of growth continued for the mean length of generation, here 
assumed to be 30 years. This gives the mean age of the fertility schedule in our 
application as r=ln(NRR)/30. These values are shown in Figure 3c. 
Long-term migration in England & Wales and Scotland      23 
 
We also assessed the sensitivity of the procedure to the assumed age-
specific fertility schedule by altering the parameters of the beta distribution to change 
from an initial mean of 30 years to 26 years in 1970 before moving it back to 30 
years by 2010, to reflect some of the main changes in the timing of fertility over the 
period. We find that this makes no meaningful difference to our conclusions.  
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Table 1. Average annual net migration rate (per 1,000) by decade, England & Wales 




 11855 values over years 1855-59 and 2000 values over years 2000-13 
2 Values for the 1910s and 1940s decades are less reliable due to problems with population 
estimated in period 1914-18 and 1939-45 in Scotland which relate only to the civilian 
population. Further details are available at Background and Documentation file. 
http://www.mortality.org/cgi-bin/hmd/country.php?cntr=GBR_SCO&level=1 . 
Source: Human Mortality Database.  
Start year England & Wales  Scotland 
         18551 -0.69  0.26 
1860 -0.30  -2.81 
1870 -0.62  -2.90 
1880 -2.01  -5.26 
1890 -0.49  -1.87 
1900 -1.08  -4.90 
 19102 -1.69  -6.31 
1920 -0.61  -8.75 
1930 1.04  -2.88 
 19402 0.64  -2.46 
1950 0.89  -4.94 
1960 0.52  -6.24 
1970 -0.03  -1.83 
1980 0.25  -2.88 
1990 0.99  -0.44 
20001 3.95  3.77 
Overall value 0.17  -3.09 
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Table 2.  Actual population and population without net migration from 1855; numbers 
























England & Wales 18,634 56,761 53,948  3.05 2.90 0.95 
Scotland 2,812 5,321 11,406  1.89 4.06 2.14 
 
Source: As for Table 1. 
 
  
Long-term migration in England & Wales and Scotland      7 
 
 
Table 3. Difference in population size (000s) in 2013 owing to migration, in decades, 
England & Wales and Scotland, 1855-2013 
 




18551 4 -68 
1860 1 -376 
1870 -218 -344 
1880 -1,134 -621 
1890 -257 -194 
1900 -653 -569 
1910 -1,177 -727 
1920 -518 -863 
1930 516 -358 
1940 186 -652 
1950 1,145 -497 
1960 497 -579 
1970 69 -195 
1980 239 -250 
1990 752 -60 
20001 3,360 267 
Total2 2,813 -6,085 
 
Notes:  
11855 values over years 1855-59 and 2000 values over years 2000-13 
2Values over period 1855-2013. 
                                                  
 
Figure 1 Population to 2013 by year net migration becomes 
zero, England & Wales and Scotland, 1855-2013 
Figure 2 Demographic indicators of natural growth, 
England & Wales and Scotland, 1855-2013 
Figure 3 Demographic indicators of population ageing by year net migration 
becomes zero, England & Wales and Scotland, 1855-2013 
(a) Proportion aged 65 and over (percent) 
Figure 3 Demographic indicators of population ageing by year net migration 
becomes zero, England & Wales and Scotland, 1855-2013 
(b) Potential support ratio (Persons aged 20-64 per person aged 65 and over) 
Appendix Figure A. Alternative indicators of fertility 
